MISSISSIPPI LEGISLATURE

2024 Regular Session

To: Judiciary B

By: Representative Currie

House Bill 1292

AN ACT TO CREATE NEW SECTION 93-5-23.1, MISSISSIPPI CODE OF 1972, TO CREATE A REBUTTABLE PRESUMPTION IN DIVORCE PROCEEDINGS THAT EQUAL (50-50) JOINT CUSTODY IS IN THE BEST INTEREST OF A CHILD; TO REQUIRE COURTS TO CONSIDER CERTAIN FACTORS IN DETERMINING IF THE PRESUMPTION FOR EQUAL JOINT CUSTODY HAS BEEN REBUTTED; TO AMEND SECTION 93-5-24, MISSISSIPPI CODE OF 1972, TO DECLARE THAT THE CREATION OF THE PRESUMPTION FOR EQUAL JOINT CUSTODY HAS NO EFFECT ON CUSTODY ORDERS ENTERED BEFORE JULY 1, 2024; TO AMEND SECTION 93-5-23, MISSISSIPPI CODE OF 1972, IN CONFORMITY TO THE PROVISIONS OF THIS ACT; AND FOR RELATED PURPOSES.

     BE IT ENACTED BY THE LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI:

     SECTION 1.  The following shall be codified as Section 93-5-23.1, Mississippi Code of 1972:

     93-5-23.1.  (1)  There is a presumption, rebuttable by a preponderance of the evidence, that equal (50-50) joint custody is in the best interest of the child.  For purposes of this section, the term "joint custody" has the meaning ascribed in Section 93-5-24.  If the presumption is rebutted, the court, absent an agreement between the parents as to all matters related to custody, must construct a parenting time schedule that maximizes the time each parent has with the child and is consistent with ensuring the child's welfare.

     (2)  In determining whether the presumption for an equal (50-50) allocation of joint custody has been rebutted, a court must consider all relevant factors, including the following:

          (a)  Factors considered by the court relating to a parent having a history of perpetrating family violence, as described under Section 93-5-24(5);

          (b)  Whether the child:

               (i)  Was conceived as a result of sexual assault or sexual abuse by a parent;

               (ii)  Has special needs, a chronic illness or other serious medical condition and would receive more appropriate care under a different custodial allocation;

               (iii)  Is a nursing child less than six (6) months of age or less than one (1) year of age if the child receives substantial nutrition through nursing; or

               (iv)  Will be separated from the child's siblings or the equal custodial arrangement otherwise will disrupt the child's opportunities to bond with the child's siblings;

          (c)  Whether a parent:

               (i)  Is willfully noncompliant with a previous order of the court regarding payment of child support for a child or children of the parties;

               (ii)  Is unwilling to seek necessary medical intervention for the child who has a serious medical condition;

               (iii)  Has a chronic illness or other condition that renders the parent unable to provide proper child care;

               (iv)  Has avoided or refused involvement intentionally or has not been involved significantly in the child's life before the court hearing, except when the lack of involvement is the result of actions on the part of the other parent which were designed to deprive the parent of contact and involvement with the child or children without good cause;

               (v)  Repeatedly causes the child or children to be in the care of a third party rather than the other parent when the other parent is available;

               (vi)  Does not have a stable housing situation; however, a parent's temporary residence with a child in a domestic violence shelter does not constitute an unsafe housing situation; or

               (vii)  Is unwilling or unable to perform caretaking functions for the child.

          (d)  Whether a parent, partner or other person living or regularly in that parent's household:

               (i)  Has been adjudicated in an abuse and neglect proceeding to have abused or neglected a child or has a pending abuse and neglect case;

               (ii)  Has been determined judicially to have committed domestic violence or has a pending domestic violence case;

               (iii)  Has a felony criminal record;

               (iv)  Is addicted to a controlled substance or alcohol;

               (v)  Has threatened or actually detained the child with the intent to retain or conceal the child from the other parent or from a third person who has legal custody.  However, a parent's temporary residence with the child in a domestic violence shelter may not be construed as evidence of the parent's intent to retain or conceal the child from other parent; or

               (vi)  Has been committed involuntarily to a mental health facility or suffers from a serious mental illness.

          (e)  Whether an allocation of equal (50-50) physical custody is:

               (i)  Impractical because of the physical distance between the parents' residences;

               (ii)  Impractical due to the cost and difficulty of transporting the child;

               (iii)  Impractical due to each parent's and the child's daily schedules;

               (iv)  Disruptive to the education of the child; or

               (v)  Contrary to the firm and reasonable preferences of a child who is fourteen (14) years of age or older, or consistent with, if the court determines it is in the best interest of the child, the firm and reasonable preferences of a child who is under fourteen (14) years of age but sufficiently mature enough to intelligently express a voluntary preference for one (1) parent.

          (f)  Whether the parents can or cannot work cooperatively and collaboratively in the best interest of the child; and

          (g)  Whether a parent will accept and encourage a positive relationship between the child and the other parent, including which parent is more likely to keep the other parent involved in the child's life and activities.

     (3)  When a court orders equal (50-50) joint custody, the court also must specify in the order which parent may claim state and federal income tax deductions and exemptions for the child or children; alternatively, claims for income tax deductions and exemptions may be divided equitably between the parents, year to year.

     SECTION 2.  Section 93-5-24, Mississippi Code of 1972, is amended as follows:

     93-5-24.  (1)  Subject to the provisions of Section 93-5-23.1 creating a rebuttable presumption for an equal (50-50) joint custody allocation, custody shall be awarded as follows according to the best interests of the child:

          (a)  Physical and legal custody to both parents jointly pursuant to subsections (2) through (7).

          (b)  Physical custody to both parents jointly pursuant to subsections (2) through (7) and legal custody to either parent.

          (c)  Legal custody to both parents jointly pursuant to subsections (2) through (7) and physical custody to either parent.

          (d)  Physical and legal custody to either parent.

          (e)  Upon a finding by the court that both of the parents of the child have abandoned or deserted such child or that both such parents are mentally, morally or otherwise unfit to rear and train the child the court may award physical and legal custody to:

              (i)  The person in whose home the child has been living in a wholesome and stable environment; or

              (ii)  Physical and legal custody to any other person deemed by the court to be suitable and able to provide adequate and proper care and guidance for the child.

     In making an order for custody to either parent or to both parents jointly, the court, in its discretion, may require the parents to submit to the court a plan for the implementation of the custody order.

     (2)  Joint custody may be awarded where irreconcilable differences is the ground for divorce, in the discretion of the court, upon application of both parents.

     (3)  In other cases, joint custody may be awarded, in the discretion of the court, upon application of one or both parents.

     (4)  There shall be a presumption that joint custody is in the best interest of a minor child where both parents have agreed to an award of joint custody.

     (5)  (a)  For the purposes of this section, "joint custody" means joint physical and legal custody.

          (b)  For the purposes of this section, "physical custody" means those periods of time in which a child resides with or is under the care and supervision of one (1) of the parents.

          (c)  For the purposes of this section, "joint physical custody" means that each of the parents shall have significant periods of physical custody.  Joint physical custody shall be shared by the parents in such a way so as to assure a child of frequent and continuing contact with both parents.

          (d)  For the purposes of this section, "legal custody" means the decision-making rights, the responsibilities and the authority relating to the health, education and welfare of a child.

          (e)  For the purposes of this section, "joint legal custody" means that the parents or parties share the decision-making rights, the responsibilities and the authority relating to the health, education and welfare of a child.  An award of joint legal custody obligates the parties to exchange information concerning the health, education and welfare of the minor child, and to confer with one another in the exercise of decision-making rights, responsibilities and authority.

     An award of joint physical and legal custody obligates the parties to exchange information concerning the health, education and welfare of the minor child, and unless allocated, apportioned or decreed, the parents or parties shall confer with one another in the exercise of decision-making rights, responsibilities and authority.

     (6)  (a)  Any order for joint custody may be modified or terminated upon the petition of both parents or upon the petition of one (1) parent showing that a material change in circumstances has occurred.

          (b)  The enactment of Section 93-5-23.1 on July 1, 2024, does not constitute a material change in circumstances or other basis for modification or termination of an order issued before that date, and the effect of a joint custody order entered before July 1, 2024, remains in full force and effect until modified by a court of competent jurisdiction.

     (7)  There shall be no presumption that it is in the best interest of a child that a mother be awarded either legal or physical custody.

     (8)  Notwithstanding any other provision of law, access to records and information pertaining to a minor child, including, but not limited to, medical, dental and school records, shall not be denied to a parent because the parent is not the child's custodial parent.

     (9)  (a)  (i)  In every proceeding where the custody of a child is in dispute, there shall be a rebuttable presumption that it is detrimental to the child and not in the best interest of the child to be placed in sole custody, joint legal custody or joint physical custody of a parent who has a history of perpetrating family violence.  To the extent that this presumption, in the determination of the court, conflicts with the presumption for equal (50-50) joint custody in Section 93-5-23.1, the court, upon considering the facts of the case, may determine to which presumption greater weight will be given.  The court may find a history of perpetrating family violence if the court finds, by a preponderance of the evidence, one (1) incident of family violence that has resulted in serious bodily injury to, or a pattern of family violence against, the party making the allegation or a family household member of either party.  The court shall make written findings to document how and why the presumption was or was not triggered.

              (ii)  This presumption may only be rebutted by a preponderance of the evidence.

              (iii)  In determining whether the presumption set forth in this subsection * * *(9) has been overcome, the court shall consider all of the following factors:

                   1.  Whether the perpetrator of family violence has demonstrated that giving sole or joint physical or legal custody of a child to the perpetrator is in the best interest of the child because of the other parent's absence, mental illness, substance abuse or such other circumstances which affect the best interest of the child or children;

                   2.  Whether the perpetrator has successfully completed a batterer's treatment program;

                   3.  Whether the perpetrator has successfully completed a program of alcohol or drug abuse counseling if the court determines that counseling is appropriate;

                   4.  Whether the perpetrator has successfully completed a parenting class if the court determines the class to be appropriate;

                   5.  If the perpetrator is on probation or parole, whether he or she is restrained by a protective order granted after a hearing, and whether he or she has complied with its terms and conditions; and

                   6.  Whether the perpetrator of domestic violence has committed any further acts of domestic violence.

              (iv)  The court shall make written findings to document how and why the presumption was or was not rebutted.

          (b)  (i)  If custody is awarded to a suitable third person, it shall not be until the natural grandparents of the child have been excluded and such person shall not allow access to a violent parent except as ordered by the court.

              (ii)  If the court finds that both parents have a history of perpetrating family violence, but the court finds that parental custody would be in the best interest of the child, custody may be awarded solely to the parent less likely to continue to perpetrate family violence.  In such a case, the court may mandate completion of a treatment program by the custodial parent.

          (c)  If the court finds that the allegations of domestic violence are completely unfounded, the chancery court shall order the alleging party to pay all court costs and reasonable attorney's fees incurred by the defending party in responding to such allegations.

          (d)  (i)  A court may award visitation by a parent who committed domestic or family violence only if the court finds that adequate provision for the safety of the child and the parent who is a victim of domestic or family violence can be made.

              (ii)  In a visitation order, a court may take any of the following actions:

                   1.  Order an exchange of the child to occur in a protected setting;

                   2.  Order visitation supervised in a manner to be determined by the court;

                   3.  Order the perpetrator of domestic or family violence to attend and complete to the satisfaction of the court a program of intervention for perpetrators or other designated counseling as a condition of visitation;

                    4.  Order the perpetrator of domestic or family violence to abstain from possession or consumption of alcohol or controlled substances during the visitation and for twenty-four (24) hours preceding the visitation;

                   5.  Order the perpetrator of domestic or family violence to pay a fee to defray the cost of supervised visitation;

                   6.  Prohibit overnight visitation;

                   7.  Require a bond from the perpetrator of domestic or family violence for the return and safety of the child; or

                   8.  Impose any other condition that is deemed necessary to provide for the safety of the child, the victim of family or domestic violence, or other family or household member.

              (iii)  Whether or not visitation is allowed, the court may order the address of the child or the victim of family or domestic violence to be kept confidential.

          (e)  The court may refer but shall not order an adult who is a victim of family or domestic violence to attend counseling relating to the victim's status or behavior as a victim, individually or with the perpetrator of domestic or family violence, as a condition of receiving custody of a child or as a condition of visitation.

          (f)  If a court allows a family or household member to supervise visitation, the court shall establish conditions to be followed during visitation.

     SECTION 3.  Section 93-5-23, Mississippi Code of 1972, is amended as follows:

     93-5-23.  When a divorce shall be decreed from the bonds of matrimony, the court may, in its discretion, having regard to the circumstances of the parties and the nature of the case, as may seem equitable and just, make all orders touching the care, custody and maintenance of the children of the marriage, and also touching the maintenance and alimony of the wife or the husband, or any allowance to be made to her or him, and shall, if need be, require bond, sureties or other guarantee for the payment of the sum so allowed.  Orders touching on the custody of the children of the marriage shall be made in accordance with the provisions of Sections 93-5-23.1 and 93-5-24.  For the purposes of orders touching the maintenance and alimony of the wife or husband, "property" and "an asset of a spouse" shall not include any interest a party may have as an heir at law of a living person or any interest under a third-party will, nor shall any such interest be considered as an economic circumstance or other factor.  The court may afterwards, on petition, change the decree, and make from time to time such new decrees as the case may require.  However, where proof shows that both parents have separate incomes or estates, the court may require that each parent contribute to the support and maintenance of the children of the marriage in proportion to the relative financial ability of each.  In the event a legally responsible parent has health insurance available to him or her through an employer or organization that may extend benefits to the dependents of such parent, any order of support issued against such parent may require him or her to exercise the option of additional coverage in favor of such children as he or she is legally responsible to support.

     Whenever the court has ordered a party to make periodic payments for the maintenance or support of a child, but no bond, sureties or other guarantee has been required to secure such payments, and whenever such payments as have become due remain unpaid for a period of at least thirty (30) days, the court may, upon petition of the person to whom such payments are owing, or such person's legal representative, enter an order requiring that bond, sureties or other security be given by the person obligated to make such payments, the amount and sufficiency of which shall be approved by the court.  The obligor shall, as in other civil actions, be served with process and shall be entitled to a hearing in such case.

     At the discretion of the court, any person found in contempt for failure to pay child support and imprisoned therefor may be referred for placement in a state, county or municipal restitution, house arrest or restorative justice center or program, provided such person meets the qualifications prescribed in Section 99-37-19.

     Whenever in any proceeding in the chancery court concerning the custody of a child a party alleges that the child whose custody is at issue has been the victim of sexual or physical abuse by the other party, the court may, on its own motion, grant a continuance in the custody proceeding only until such allegation has been investigated by the Department of Child Protection Services.  At the time of ordering such continuance, the court may direct the party and his attorney making such allegation of child abuse to report in writing and provide all evidence touching on the allegation of abuse to the Department of Child Protection Services.  The Department of Child Protection Services shall investigate such allegation and take such action as it deems appropriate and as provided in such cases under the Youth Court Law (being Chapter 21 of Title 43, Mississippi Code of 1972) or under the laws establishing family courts (being Chapter 23 of Title 43, Mississippi Code of 1972).

     If after investigation by the Department of Child Protection Services or final disposition by the youth court or family court allegations of child abuse are found to be without foundation, the chancery court shall order the alleging party to pay all court costs and reasonable attorney's fees incurred by the defending party in responding to such allegation.

     The court may investigate, hear and make a determination in a custody action when a charge of abuse and/or neglect arises in the course of a custody action as provided in Section 43-21-151, and in such cases the court shall appoint a guardian ad litem for the child as provided under Section 43-21-121, who shall be an attorney.  Unless the chancery court's jurisdiction has been terminated, all disposition orders in such cases for placement with the Department of Child Protection Services shall be reviewed by the court or designated authority at least annually to determine if continued placement with the department is in the best interest of the child or public.

     The duty of support of a child terminates upon the emancipation of the child.  The court may determine that emancipation has occurred pursuant to Section 93-11-65.

     Custody and visitation upon military temporary duty, deployment or mobilization shall be governed by Section 93-5-34.

     SECTION 4.  This act shall take effect and be in force from and after July 1, 2024.