MISSISSIPPI LEGISLATURE

2010 Regular Session

To: Judiciary, Division B

By: Senator(s) Walls

Senate Bill 2251

AN ACT TO AMEND SECTION 97-3-7, MISSISSIPPI CODE OF 1972, TO EXTEND ENHANCEMENT OF PENALTIES FOR SIMPLE AND AGGRAVATED ASSAULT TO OFF-DUTY LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS WHO REASONABLY BELIEVE THEY ARE BEING SUBJECTED TO ASSAULT AS A RESULT OF ANY PAST PERFORMANCE OF LAWFUL DUTY; TO AMEND SECTION 97-3-15, MISSISSIPPI CODE OF 1972, TO EXTEND THE CASTLE DOCTRINE TO OFF-DUTY LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS WHO REASONABLY BELIEVE THEY ARE BEING SUBJECTED TO ASSAULT AS A RESULT OF ANY PAST PERFORMANCE OF LAWFUL DUTY; AND FOR RELATED PURPOSES.

     BE IT ENACTED BY THE LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI:

     SECTION 1.  Section 97-3-7, Mississippi Code of 1972, is amended as follows:

     97-3-7.  (1)  A person is guilty of simple assault if he (a) attempts to cause or purposely, knowingly or recklessly causes bodily injury to another; or (b) negligently causes bodily injury to another with a deadly weapon or other means likely to produce death or serious bodily harm; or (c) attempts by physical menace to put another in fear of imminent serious bodily harm; and, upon conviction, he shall be punished by a fine of not more than Five Hundred Dollars ($500.00) or by imprisonment in the county jail for not more than six (6) months, or both.  However, a person convicted of simple assault (a) upon a statewide elected official, law enforcement officer, fireman, emergency medical personnel, public health personnel, social worker or family protection specialist or family protection worker employed by the Department of Human Services or another agency, youth detention center personnel, training school juvenile care worker, any county or municipal jail officer, superintendent, principal, teacher or other instructional personnel, school attendance officer, school bus driver, or a judge of a circuit, chancery, county, justice, municipal or youth court or a judge of the Court of Appeals or a justice of the Supreme Court, district attorney, legal assistant to a district attorney, county prosecutor, municipal prosecutor, court reporter employed by a court, court administrator, clerk or deputy clerk of the court, or public defender, while such statewide elected official, judge or justice, law enforcement officer, fireman, emergency medical personnel, public health personnel, social worker, family protection specialist, family protection worker, youth detention center personnel, training school juvenile care worker, any county or municipal jail officer, superintendent, principal, teacher or other instructional personnel, school attendance officer, school bus driver, district attorney, legal assistant to a district attorney, county prosecutor, municipal prosecutor, court reporter employed by a court, court administrator, clerk or deputy clerk of the court, or public defender is acting within the scope of his duty, office or employment; (b) upon a legislator while the Legislature is in regular or extraordinary session or while otherwise acting within the scope of his duty, office or employment; * * * (c) upon a person who is sixty-five (65) years of age or older or a person who is a vulnerable adult as defined in Section 43-47-5; or (d) upon an off-duty law enforcement officer when the assault is related to any performance of the officer's lawful duty, shall be punished by a fine of not more than One Thousand Dollars ($1,000.00) or by imprisonment for not more than five (5) years, or both.

     (2)  A person is guilty of aggravated assault if he (a) attempts to cause serious bodily injury to another, or causes such injury purposely, knowingly or recklessly under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life; or (b) attempts to cause or purposely or knowingly causes bodily injury to another with a deadly weapon or other means likely to produce death or serious bodily harm; and, upon conviction, he shall be punished by imprisonment in the county jail for not more than one (1) year or in the Penitentiary for not more than twenty (20) years.  However, a person convicted of aggravated assault (a) upon a statewide elected official, law enforcement officer, fireman, emergency medical personnel, public health personnel, social worker, family protection specialist, family protection worker employed by the Department of Human Services or another agency, youth detention center personnel, training school juvenile care worker, any county or municipal jail officer, superintendent, principal, teacher or other instructional personnel, school attendance officer, school bus driver, or a judge of a circuit, chancery, county, justice, municipal or youth court or a judge of the Court of Appeals or a justice of the Supreme Court, district attorney, legal assistant to a district attorney, county prosecutor, municipal prosecutor, court reporter employed by a court, court administrator, clerk or deputy clerk of the court, or public defender, while such statewide elected official, judge or justice, law enforcement officer, fireman, emergency medical personnel, public health personnel, social worker, family protection specialist, family protection worker, youth detention center personnel, training school juvenile care worker, any county or municipal jail officer, superintendent, principal, teacher or other instructional personnel, school attendance officer, school bus driver, district attorney, legal assistant to a district attorney, county prosecutor, municipal prosecutor, court reporter employed by a court, court administrator, clerk or deputy clerk of the court, or public defender is acting within the scope of his duty, office or employment; (b) upon a legislator while the Legislature is in regular or extraordinary session or while otherwise acting within the scope of his duty, office or employment; * * * (c) upon a person who is sixty-five (65) years of age or older or a person who is a vulnerable adult as defined in Section 43-47-5; or (d) upon an off-duty law enforcement officer when the assault is related to any performance of the officer's lawful duty, shall be punished by a fine of not more than Five Thousand Dollars ($5,000.00) or by imprisonment for not more than thirty (30) years, or both.

     (3)  A person is guilty of simple domestic violence who commits simple assault as described in subsection (1) of this section against a current or former spouse or a child of that person, a person living as a spouse or who formerly lived as a spouse with the defendant or a child of that person, other persons related by consanguinity or affinity who reside with or formerly resided with the defendant, a person who has a current or former dating relationship with the defendant, or a person with whom the defendant has had a biological or legally adopted child and, upon conviction, the defendant shall be punished as provided under subsection (1) of this section; however, upon a third or subsequent conviction of simple domestic violence, whether against the same or another victim and within five (5) years, the defendant shall be guilty of a felony and sentenced to a term of imprisonment not less than five (5) nor more than ten (10) years.  In sentencing, the court shall consider as an aggravating factor whether the crime was committed in the physical presence or hearing of a child under sixteen (16) years of age who was, at the time of the offense, living within either the residence of the victim, the residence of the perpetrator, or the residence where the offense occurred.

     (4)  A person is guilty of aggravated domestic violence who commits aggravated assault as described in subsection (2) of this section against a current or former spouse or a child of that person, a person living as a spouse or who formerly lived as a spouse with the defendant, other persons related by consanguinity or affinity who reside with or formerly resided with the defendant or a child of that person, a person who has a current or former dating relationship with the defendant, or a person with whom the defendant has had a biological or legally adopted child and, upon conviction, the defendant shall be punished as provided under subsection (2) of this section; however, upon a third or subsequent offense of aggravated domestic violence, whether against the same or another victim and within five (5) years, the defendant shall be guilty of a felony and sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not less than five (5) nor more than twenty (20) years.  In sentencing, the court shall consider as an aggravating factor whether the crime was committed in the physical presence or hearing of a child under sixteen (16) years of age who was, at the time of the offense, living within either the residence of the victim, the residence of the perpetrator, or the residence where the offense occurred.  Reasonable discipline of a child, such as spanking, is not an offense under this subsection (4).

     (5)  "Dating relationship" means a social relationship as defined in Section 93-21-3.

     (6)  Every conviction of domestic violence may require as a condition of any suspended sentence that the defendant participate in counseling or treatment to bring about the cessation of domestic abuse.  The defendant may be required to pay all or part of the cost of the counseling or treatment, in the discretion of the court.

     (7)  When investigating allegations of a violation of subsection (3) or (4) of this section, law enforcement officers shall utilize the form prescribed for such purposes by the Office of the Attorney General in consultation with the sheriff's and police chief's associations.

     (8)  In any conviction of assault as described in any subsection of this section which arises from an incident of domestic violence, the sentencing order shall include the designation "domestic violence."  The court shall forward a copy of each sentencing order bearing the designation "domestic violence" to the Office of the Attorney General.

     SECTION 2.  Section 97-3-15, Mississippi Code of 1972, is amended as follows:

     97-3-15.  (1)  The killing of a human being by the act, procurement or omission of another shall be justifiable in the following cases:

          (a)  When committed by public officers, or those acting by their aid and assistance, in obedience to any judgment of a competent court;

          (b)  When necessarily committed by public officers, or those acting by their command in their aid and assistance, in overcoming actual resistance to the execution of some legal process, or to the discharge of any other legal duty;

          (c)  When necessarily committed by public officers, or those acting by their command in their aid and assistance, in retaking any felon who has been rescued or has escaped;

          (d)  When necessarily committed by public officers, or those acting by their command in their aid and assistance, in arresting any felon fleeing from justice;

          (e)  When committed by any person in resisting any attempt unlawfully to kill such person or to commit any felony upon him, or upon or in any dwelling, in any occupied vehicle, in any place of business, in any place of employment or in the immediate premises thereof in which such person shall be;

          (f)  When committed in the lawful defense of one's own person or any other human being, where there shall be reasonable ground to apprehend a design to commit a felony or to do some great personal injury, and there shall be imminent danger of such design being accomplished;

          (g)  When necessarily committed in attempting by lawful ways and means to apprehend any person for any felony committed;

          (h)  When necessarily committed in lawfully suppressing any riot or in lawfully keeping and preserving the peace.

     (2)  (a)  As used in subsection (1)(c) and (d) of this section, the term "when necessarily committed" means that a public officer or a person acting by or at the officer's command, aid or assistance is authorized to use such force as necessary in securing and detaining the felon offender, overcoming the offender's resistance, preventing the offender's escape, recapturing the offender if the offender escapes or in protecting himself or others from bodily harm; but such officer or person shall not be authorized to resort to deadly or dangerous means when to do so would be unreasonable under the circumstances.  The public officer or person acting by or at the officer's command may act upon a reasonable apprehension of the surrounding circumstances; however, such officer or person shall not use excessive force or force that is greater than reasonably necessary in securing and detaining the offender, overcoming the offender's resistance, preventing the offender's escape, recapturing the offender if the offender escapes or in protecting himself or others from bodily harm.

          (b)  As used in subsection (1)(c) and (d) of this section the term "felon" shall include an offender who has been convicted of a felony and shall also include an offender who is in custody, or whose custody is being sought, on a charge or for an offense which is punishable, upon conviction, by death or confinement in the Penitentiary.

          (c)  As used in subsections (1)(e) and (3) of this section, "dwelling" means a building or conveyance of any kind that has a roof over it, whether the building or conveyance is temporary or permanent, mobile or immobile, including a tent, that is designed to be occupied by people lodging therein at night, including any attached porch.

     (3)  A person who uses defensive force shall be presumed to have reasonably feared imminent death or great bodily harm, or the commission of a felony upon him or another or upon his dwelling, or against a vehicle which he was occupying, or against his business or place of employment or the immediate premises of such business or place of employment, if the person against whom the defensive force was used, was in the process of unlawfully and forcibly entering, or had unlawfully and forcibly entered, a dwelling, occupied vehicle, business, place of employment or the immediate premises thereof or if that person had unlawfully removed or was attempting to unlawfully remove another against the other person's will from that dwelling, occupied vehicle, business, place of employment or the immediate premises thereof and the person who used defensive force knew or had reason to believe that the forcible entry or unlawful and forcible act was occurring or had occurred.  This presumption shall not apply if the person against whom defensive force was used has a right to be in or is a lawful resident or owner of the dwelling, vehicle, business, place of employment or the immediate premises thereof or is the lawful resident or owner of the dwelling, vehicle, business, place of employment or the immediate premises thereof or if the person who uses defensive force is engaged in unlawful activity or if the person is a law enforcement officer engaged in the performance of his official duties.

     (4)  A person who is not the initial aggressor and is not engaged in unlawful activity shall have no duty to retreat before using deadly force under subsection (1)(e) or (f) of this section if the person is in a place where the person has a right to be, or if the person is a law enforcement officer who reasonably believes that the officer is being or is about to be assaulted by someone who is seeking retaliation for any lawful performance of the officer's lawful duty, and no finder of fact shall be permitted to consider the person's failure to retreat as evidence that the person's use of force was unnecessary, excessive or unreasonable.

     (5)  (a)  The presumptions contained in subsection (3) of this section shall apply in civil cases in which self-defense or defense of another is claimed as a defense.

          (b)  The court shall award reasonable attorney's fees, court costs, compensation for loss of income, and all expenses incurred by the defendant in defense of any civil action brought by a plaintiff if the court finds that the defendant acted in accordance with subsection (1)(e) or (f) of this section.  A defendant who has previously been adjudicated "not guilty" of any crime by reason of subsection (1)(e) or (f) of this section shall be immune from any civil action for damages arising from same conduct.

     SECTION 3.  This act shall take effect and be in force from and after July 1, 2010.