MISSISSIPPI LEGISLATURE
2004 1st Extraordinary Session
To: Judiciary A
By: Representative Blackmon, Simpson, Compretta, Smith (39th), Franks, Watson, Moak
AN ACT TO AMEND SECTION 11-11-3, MISSISSIPPI CODE OF 1972, TO REVISE THE VENUE IN GENERAL CIVIL ACTIONS; TO AMEND SECTION 11-1-60, MISSISSIPPI CODE OF 1972, TO REVISE THE LIMITATION ON NONECONOMIC DAMAGES IN MALPRACTICE ACTIONS AND TO PROVIDE LIMITATIONS ON NONECONOMIC DAMAGES IN ALL OTHER CIVIL ACTIONS; TO AMEND SECTION 11-1-63, MISSISSIPPI CODE OF 1972, TO PROVIDE THAT A PRODUCT SELLER OTHER THAN A MANUFACTURER SHALL NOT BE LIABLE FOR A LATENT DEFECT IF THE SELLER IS A MERE CONDUIT WHO PURCHASED THE PRODUCT FROM A REPUTABLE MANUFACTURER; TO AMEND SECTION 11-1-65, MISSISSIPPI CODE OF 1972, TO REVISE PUNITIVE DAMAGES; TO AMEND SECTION 11-1-66, MISSISSIPPI CODE OF 1972, TO REVISE PREMISES LIABILITY; TO AMEND SECTION 85-5-7, MISSISSIPPI CODE OF 1972, TO REVISE THE LIMITATION OF JOINT AND SEVERAL LIABILITY FOR DAMAGES CAUSED BY TWO OR MORE PERSONS; TO REPEAL SECTION 11-1-64, MISSISSIPPI CODE OF 1972, WHICH PROVIDES THE PROCEDURE FOR DISMISSING A DEFENDANT WHOSE LIABILITY IS BASED SOLELY ON HIS STATUS AS A SELLER IN THE STREAM OF COMMERCE; TO AMEND SECTION 13-5-23, MISSISSIPPI CODE OF 1972, TO PROVIDE THAT JURORS CAN ONLY BE EXCUSED FROM SERVICE FOR ILLNESS OR UNDUE HARDSHIP; TO AMEND SECTION 13-5-25, MISSISSIPPI CODE OF 1972, TO LIMIT THE FREQUENCY OF JURY SERVICE; TO AMEND SECTION 13-5-28, MISSISSIPPI CODE OF 1972, TO REQUIRE NOTICE OF JURY SERVICE EXEMPTION ENTITLEMENT TO BE INCLUDED IN JUROR SUMMONSES; TO AMEND SECTION 13-5-34, MISSISSIPPI CODE OF 1972, TO REVISE THE PUNISHMENT FOR FAILURE TO APPEAR FOR JURY SERVICE; TO AMEND SECTION 25-7-61, MISSISSIPPI CODE OF 1972, TO CREATE A LENGTHY TRIAL FUND AND TO MAKE CLEAR THAT NO COUNTY FUNDS WILL BE USED TO PAY SUPPLEMENTAL OR REPLACEMENT WAGES TO JURORS UNDER THE ACT; TO AMEND SECTION 33-1-5, MISSISSIPPI CODE OF 1972, TO ELIMINATE CERTAIN JUROR EXEMPTIONS; TO PROVIDE THAT JURORS CAN POSTPONE JURY SERVICE ONE TIME ONLY; TO PROVIDE EMPLOYMENT PROTECTIONS FOR JURORS; TO AMEND SECTION 73-25-27, MISSISSIPPI CODE OF 1972, TO PROVIDE THE RIGHT FOR HARMED PATIENTS TO ATTEND DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS INVOLVING THE PHYSICIAN RESPONSIBLE FOR THE HARM; TO PROVIDE FOR A WAIVER OF THE MEDICAL PRIVILEGE IN CERTAIN CASES; TO ALLOW BENCH TRIALS IN CERTAIN CASES IF THE PARTIES AGREE; AND FOR RELATED PURPOSES.
BE IT ENACTED BY THE LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI:
SECTION 1. Section 11-11-3, Mississippi Code of 1972, is amended as follows:
11-11-3. (1) (a) (i) Civil actions of which the circuit court has original jurisdiction shall be commenced in the county where the defendant resides, or, if a corporation, in the county of its principal place of business, or in the county where a substantial alleged act or omission occurred or where a substantial event that caused the injury occurred. * * *
(ii) Civil actions alleging a defective product may also be commenced in the county where the plaintiff obtained the product.
(b) If venue in a civil action against a nonresident defendant cannot be asserted under paragraph (a) of this subsection (1), a civil action against a nonresident may be commenced in the county where the plaintiff resides or is domiciled.
(2) In any civil action where more than one (1) plaintiff is joined, each plaintiff shall independently establish proper venue; it is not sufficient that venue is proper for any other plaintiff joined in the civil action.
(3) Notwithstanding subsection (1) of this section, any action against a licensed physician, osteopath, dentist, nurse, nurse-practitioner, physician assistant, psychologist, pharmacist, podiatrist, optometrist, chiropractor, institution for the aged or infirm, hospital or licensed pharmacy, including any legal entity which may be liable for their acts or omissions, for malpractice, negligence, error, omission, mistake, breach of standard of care or the unauthorized rendering of professional services shall be brought only in the county in which the alleged act or omission occurred.
(4) (a) If a court of this state, on written motion of a party, finds that in the interest of justice and for the convenience of the parties and witnesses a claim or action would be more properly heard in a forum outside this state or in a different county of proper venue within this state, the court shall decline to adjudicate the matter under the doctrine of forum non conveniens. As to a claim or action that would be more properly heard in a forum outside this state, the court shall dismiss the claim or action. As to a claim or action that would be more properly heard in a different county of proper venue within this state, the venue shall be transferred to the appropriate county. In determining whether to grant a motion to dismiss an action or to transfer venue under the doctrine of forum non conveniens, the court shall give consideration to the following factors:
(i) Relative ease of access to sources of proof;
(ii) Availability and cost of compulsory process for attendance of unwilling witnesses;
(iii) Possibility of viewing of the premises, if viewing would be appropriate to the action;
(iv) Unnecessary expense or trouble to the defendant not necessary to the plaintiff's own right to pursue his remedy;
(v) Administrative difficulties for the forum courts;
(vi) Existence of local interests in deciding the case at home; and
(vii) The traditional deference given to a plaintiff's choice of forum.
(b) A court may not dismiss a claim under this subsection until the defendant files with the court or with the clerk of the court a written stipulation that, with respect to a new action on the claim commenced by the plaintiff, all the defendants waive the right to assert a statute of limitations defense in all other states of the United States in which the claim was not barred by limitations at the time the claim was filed in this state as necessary to effect a tolling of the limitations periods in those states beginning on the date the claim was filed in this state and ending on the date the claim is dismissed.
SECTION 2. Section 11-1-60, Mississippi Code of 1972, is amended as follows:
11-1-60. (1) For the purposes of this section, the following words and phrases shall have the meanings ascribed herein unless the context clearly requires otherwise:
(a) "Noneconomic damages" means subjective, nonpecuniary damages arising from death, pain, suffering, inconvenience, mental anguish, worry, emotional distress, loss of society and companionship, loss of consortium, bystander injury, physical impairment, disfigurement, injury to reputation, humiliation, embarrassment, loss of the enjoyment of life, hedonic damages, other nonpecuniary damages, and any other theory of damages such as fear of loss, illness or injury. The term "noneconomic damages" shall not include * * * punitive or exemplary damages.
(b) "Actual economic damages" means objectively verifiable pecuniary damages arising from medical expenses and medical care, rehabilitation services, custodial care, disabilities, loss of earnings and earning capacity, loss of income, burial costs, loss of use of property, costs of repair or replacement of property, costs of obtaining substitute domestic services, loss of employment, loss of business or employment opportunities, and other objectively verifiable monetary losses.
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(2) (a) In any cause of action filed on or after September 1, 2004, for injury based on malpractice or breach of standard of care against a provider of health care, including institutions for the aged or infirm, in the event the trier of fact finds the defendant liable, they shall not award the plaintiff more than Five Hundred Thousand Dollars ($500,000.00) for noneconomic damages.
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(b) In any civil action filed on or after September 1, 2004, other than those actions described in paragraph (a) of this subsection, in the event the trier of fact finds the defendant liable, they shall not award the plaintiff more than One Million Dollars ($1,000,000.00) for noneconomic damages.
It is the intent of this section to limit all noneconomic damages to the above.
(c) The trier of fact shall not be advised of the limitations imposed by this subsection (2) and the judge shall appropriately reduce any award of noneconomic damages that exceeds the applicable limitation.
(3) Nothing contained in subsection (1) of this section shall be construed as creating a cause of action or as setting forth elements of or types of damages that are or are not recoverable in any type of cause of action.
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SECTION 3. Section 11-1-63, Mississippi Code of 1972, is amended as follows:
11-1-63. Subject to the provisions of Section 11-1-64, in any action for damages caused by a product except for commercial damage to the product itself:
(a) The manufacturer or seller of the product shall not be liable if the claimant does not prove by the preponderance of the evidence that at the time the product left the control of the manufacturer or seller:
(i) 1. The product was defective because it deviated in a material way from the manufacturer's specifications or from otherwise identical units manufactured to the same manufacturing specifications, or
2. The product was defective because it failed to contain adequate warnings or instructions, or
3. The product was designed in a defective manner, or
4. The product breached an express warranty or failed to conform to other express factual representations upon which the claimant justifiably relied in electing to use the product; and
(ii) The defective condition rendered the product unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer; and
(iii) The defective and unreasonably dangerous condition of the product proximately caused the damages for which recovery is sought.
(b) A product is not defective in design or formulation if the harm for which the claimant seeks to recover compensatory damages was caused by an inherent characteristic of the product which is a generic aspect of the product that cannot be eliminated without substantially compromising the product's usefulness or desirability and which is recognized by the ordinary person with the ordinary knowledge common to the community.
(c) (i) In any action alleging that a product is defective because it failed to contain adequate warnings or instructions pursuant to paragraph (a)(i)2 of this section, the manufacturer or seller shall not be liable if the claimant does not prove by the preponderance of the evidence that at the time the product left the control of the manufacturer or seller, the manufacturer or seller knew or in light of reasonably available knowledge should have known about the danger that caused the damage for which recovery is sought and that the ordinary user or consumer would not realize its dangerous condition.
(ii) An adequate product warning or instruction is one that a reasonably prudent person in the same or similar circumstances would have provided with respect to the danger and that communicates sufficient information on the dangers and safe use of the product, taking into account the characteristics of, and the ordinary knowledge common to an ordinary consumer who purchases the product; or in the case of a prescription drug, medical device or other product that is intended to be used only under the supervision of a physician or other licensed professional person, taking into account the characteristics of, and the ordinary knowledge common to, a physician or other licensed professional who prescribes the drug, device or other product.
(d) In any action alleging that a product is defective pursuant to paragraph (a) of this section, the manufacturer or seller shall not be liable if the claimant (i) had knowledge of a condition of the product that was inconsistent with his safety; (ii) appreciated the danger in the condition; and (iii) deliberately and voluntarily chose to expose himself to the danger in such a manner to register assent on the continuance of the dangerous condition.
(e) In any action alleging that a product is defective pursuant to paragraph (a)(i)2 of this section, the manufacturer or seller shall not be liable if the danger posed by the product is known or is open and obvious to the user or consumer of the product, or should have been known or open and obvious to the user or consumer of the product, taking into account the characteristics of, and the ordinary knowledge common to, the persons who ordinarily use or consume the product.
(f) In any action alleging that a product is defective because of its design pursuant to paragraph (a)(i)3 of this section, the manufacturer or product seller shall not be liable if the claimant does not prove by the preponderance of the evidence that at the time the product left the control of the manufacturer or seller:
(i) The manufacturer or seller knew, or in light of reasonably available knowledge or in the exercise of reasonable care should have known, about the danger that caused the damage for which recovery is sought; and
(ii) The product failed to function as expected and there existed a feasible design alternative that would have to a reasonable probability prevented the harm. A feasible design alternative is a design that would have to a reasonable probability prevented the harm without impairing the utility, usefulness, practicality or desirability of the product to users or consumers.
(g) (i) The manufacturer of a product who is found liable for a defective product pursuant to paragraph (a) shall indemnify a product seller for the costs of litigation, any reasonable expenses, reasonable attorney's fees and any damages awarded by the trier of fact unless the seller exercised substantial control over that aspect of the design, testing, manufacture, packaging or labeling of the product that caused the harm for which recovery of damages is sought; the seller altered or modified the product, and the alteration or modification was a substantial factor in causing the harm for which recovery of damages is sought; the seller had actual knowledge of the defective condition of the product at the time he supplied same; or the seller made an express factual representation about the aspect of the product which caused the harm for which recovery of damages is sought.
(ii) Subparagraph (i) shall not apply unless the seller has given prompt notice of the suit to the manufacturer within ninety (90) days of the service of the complaint against the seller.
(h) In any action alleging that a product is defective pursuant to paragraph (a) of this section, the seller of a product other than the manufacturer shall not be liable unless the seller exercised substantial control over that aspect of the design, testing, manufacture, packaging or labeling of the product that caused the harm for which recovery of damages is sought; or the seller altered or modified the product, and the alteration or modification was a substantial factor in causing the harm for which recovery of damages is sought; or the seller had actual or constructive knowledge of the defective condition of the product at the time he supplied the product. It is the intent of this section to immunize innocent sellers who are not actively negligent, but instead are mere conduits of a product.
(i) Nothing in this section shall be construed to eliminate any common law defense to an action for damages caused by a product.
SECTION 4. Section 11-1-65, Mississippi Code of 1972, is amended as follows:
11-1-65. (1) In any action in which punitive damages are sought:
(a) Punitive damages may not be awarded if the claimant does not prove by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant against whom punitive damages are sought acted with actual malice, gross negligence which evidences a willful, wanton or reckless disregard for the safety of others, or committed actual fraud.
(b) In any action in which the claimant seeks an award of punitive damages, the trier of fact shall first determine whether compensatory damages are to be awarded and in what amount, before addressing any issues related to punitive damages.
(c) If, but only if, an award of compensatory damages has been made against a party, the court shall promptly commence an evidentiary hearing * * * to determine whether punitive damages may be considered by the same trier of fact.
(d) The court shall determine whether the issue of punitive damages may be submitted to the trier of fact; and, if so, the trier of fact shall determine whether to award punitive damages and in what amount.
(e) In all cases involving an award of punitive damages, the fact finder, in determining the amount of punitive damages, shall consider, to the extent relevant, the following: the defendant's financial condition and net worth; the nature and reprehensibility of the defendant's wrongdoing, for example, the impact of the defendant's conduct on the plaintiff, or the relationship of the defendant to the plaintiff; the defendant's awareness of the amount of harm being caused and the defendant's motivation in causing such harm; the duration of the defendant's misconduct and whether the defendant attempted to conceal such misconduct; and any other circumstances shown by the evidence that bear on determining a proper amount of punitive damages. The trier of fact shall be instructed that the primary purpose of punitive damages is to punish the wrongdoer and deter similar misconduct in the future by the defendant and others while the purpose of compensatory damages is to make the plaintiff whole.
(f) (i) Before entering judgment for an award of punitive damages the trial court shall ascertain that the award is reasonable in its amount and rationally related to the purpose to punish what occurred giving rise to the award and to deter its repetition by the defendant and others.
(ii) In determining whether the award is excessive, the court shall take into consideration the following factors:
1. Whether there is a reasonable relationship between the punitive damage award and the harm likely to result from the defendant's conduct as well as the harm that actually occurred;
2. The degree of reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct, the duration of that conduct, the defendant's awareness, any concealment, and the existence and frequency of similar past conduct;
3. The financial condition and net worth of the defendant; and
4. In mitigation, the imposition of criminal sanctions on the defendant for its conduct and the existence of other civil awards against the defendant for the same conduct.
(2) The seller of a product other than the manufacturer shall not be liable for punitive damages unless the seller exercised substantial control over that aspect of the design, testing, manufacture, packaging or labeling of the product that caused the harm for which recovery of damages is sought; the seller altered or modified the product, and the alteration or modification was a substantial factor in causing the harm for which recovery of damages is sought; the seller had actual knowledge of the defective condition of the product at the time he supplied same * * *.
(3) (a) In any civil action where an entitlement to punitive damages shall have been established under applicable laws, no award of punitive damages shall exceed the following:
(i) Twenty Million Dollars ($20,000,000.00) for a defendant with a net worth of more than One Billion Dollars ($1,000,000,000.00);
(ii) Fifteen Million Dollars ($15,000,000.00) for a defendant with a net worth of more than Seven Hundred Fifty Million Dollars ($750,000,000.00) but not more than One Billion Dollars ($1,000,000,000.00);
(iii) Five Million Dollars ($5,000,000.00) for a defendant with a net worth of more than Five Hundred Million Dollars ($500,000,000.00) but not more than Seven Hundred Fifty Million Dollars ($750,000,000.00);
(iv) Three Million Seven Hundred Fifty Thousand Dollars ($3,750,000.00) for a defendant with a net worth of more than One Hundred Million Dollars ($100,000,000.00) but not more than Five Hundred Million Dollars ($500,000,000.00);
(v) Two Million Five Hundred Thousand Dollars ($2,500,000.00) for a defendant with a net worth of more than Fifty Million Dollars ($50,000,000.00) but not more than One Hundred Million Dollars ($100,000,000.00); or
(vi) Two percent (2%) of the defendant's net worth for a defendant with a net worth of Fifty Million Dollars ($50,000,000.00) or less.
(b) For the purposes of determining the defendant's net worth in paragraph (a), the amount of the net worth shall be determined in accordance with Generally Accepted Accounting Principles.
(c) The limitation on the amount of punitive damages imposed by this subsection (3) shall not be disclosed to the trier of fact, but shall be applied by the court to any punitive damages verdict.
(d) The limitation on the amount of punitive damages imposed by this subsection (3) shall not apply to actions brought for damages or an injury resulting from an act or failure to act by the defendant:
(i) If the defendant was convicted of a felony under the laws of this state or under federal law which caused the damages or injury; or
(ii) While the defendant was under the influence of alcohol or under the influence of drugs other than lawfully prescribed drugs administered in accordance with a prescription.
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(4) Nothing in this section shall be construed as creating a right to an award of punitive damages or to limit the duty of the court, or the appellate courts, to scrutinize all punitive damage awards, ensure that all punitive damage awards comply with applicable procedural, evidentiary and constitutional requirements, and to order remittitur where appropriate.
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SECTION 5. Section 11-1-66, Mississippi Code of 1972, is amended as follows:
11-1-66. No owner, occupant, lessee or managing agent of property shall be * * * liable for the death or injury of an independent contractor or the independent contractor's employees resulting from dangers of which the contractor knew or reasonably should have known.
SECTION 6. Section 85-5-7, Mississippi Code of 1972, is amended as follows:
85-5-7. (1) As used in this section, "fault" means an act or omission of a person which is a proximate cause of injury or death to another person or persons, damages to property, tangible or intangible, or economic injury, including, but not limited to, negligence, malpractice, strict liability, absolute liability or failure to warn. "Fault" shall not include any tort which results from an act or omission committed with a specific wrongful intent.
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(2) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (4) of this section, in any civil action based on fault, the liability for damages caused by two (2) or more persons shall be several only, and not joint and several and a joint tort-feasor shall be liable only for the amount of damages allocated to him in direct proportion to his percentage of fault. In assessing percentages of fault an employer and the employer's employee or a principal and the principal's agent shall be considered as one (1) defendant when the liability of such employer or principal has been caused by the wrongful or negligent act or omission of the employee or agent.
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(3) Nothing in this section shall eliminate or diminish any defenses or immunities which currently exist, except as expressly noted herein.
(4) Joint and several liability shall be imposed on all who consciously and deliberately pursue a common plan or design to commit a tortious act, or actively take part in it. Any person held jointly and severally liable under this section shall have a right of contribution from his fellow defendants acting in concert.
(5) In actions involving joint tort-feasors, the trier of fact shall determine the percentage of fault for each party alleged to be at fault without regard to whether the joint tort-feasor is immune from damages. Fault allocated under this subsection to an immune tort-feasor or a tort-feasor whose liability is limited by law shall not be reallocated to any other tort-feasor.
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(6) Nothing in this section shall be construed to create a cause of action. Nothing in this section shall be construed, in any way, to alter the immunity of any person.
SECTION 7. Section 11-1-64, Mississippi Code of 1972, which provides the procedure for dismissing a defendant whose liability is based solely on his status as a seller in the stream of commerce, is hereby repealed.
SECTION 8. Section 13-5-23, Mississippi Code of 1972, is amended as follows:
13-5-23. (1) All qualified persons shall be liable to serve as jurors, unless excused by the court for one (1) of the following causes:
(a) When the juror is ill and, on account of the illness, is incapable of performing jury service; or * * *
(b) When the juror's attendance would cause undue or extreme physical or financial hardship to the prospective juror or a person under his or her care or supervision.
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(2) An excuse of illness under subsection (1)(a) of this section may be made to the clerk of court outside of open court by providing the clerk with * * * a certificate of a licensed physician * * *, stating that the juror is ill and is unfit for jury service, in which case the clerk may excuse the juror. If the excuse of illness is not supported by a physician's certificate, a judge of the court for which the individual was called to jury service shall decide whether to excuse an individual under subsection (1)(a) of this section.
(3) (a) The test of an excuse under subsection (1)(b) of this section for undue or extreme physical or financial hardship shall be whether the individual would either:
(i) Be required to abandon a person under his or her personal care or supervision due to the impossibility of obtaining an appropriate substitute caregiver during the period of participation in the jury pool or on the jury; or
(ii) Incur costs that would have a substantial adverse impact on the payment of the individual's necessary daily living expenses or on those for whom he or she provides the principal means of support; or
(iii) Suffer physical hardship that would result in illness or disease.
(b) "Undue or extreme physical or financial hardship" does not exist solely based on the fact that a prospective juror will be required to be absent from his or her place of employment or business.
(c) A judge of the court for which the individual was called to jury service shall decide whether to excuse an individual under subsection (1)(b) of this section.
(d) A person asking to be excused based on a finding of undue or extreme physical or financial hardship must take all actions necessary to have obtained a ruling on that request by no later than the date on which the individual is scheduled to appear for jury duty.
(e) A person asking a judge to grant an excuse under subsection (1)(b) of this section shall be required to provide the judge with documentation such as, but not limited to, federal and state income tax returns, medical statements from licensed physicians, proof of dependency or guardianship and similar documents, which the judge finds to clearly support the request to be excused. Failure to provide satisfactory documentation shall result in a denial of the request to be excused.
(4) After two (2) years, a person excused from jury service shall become eligible once again for qualification as a juror unless the person was excused from service permanently. A person is excused from jury service permanently only when the deciding judge determines that the underlying grounds for being excused are of a permanent nature.
(5) * * * A tales juror * * * shall not be compelled to serve two (2) days successively unless the case in which the juror is impaneled continues longer than one (1) day. Grand jurors shall serve until discharged by the court.
SECTION 9. Section 13-5-25, Mississippi Code of 1972, is amended as follows:
13-5-25. Every citizen over sixty-five (65) years of age, and everyone who has served on the regular panel as a juror in the actual trial of one or more litigated cases within two (2) years, shall be exempt from service if he claims the privilege * * *. No qualified juror shall be excluded because of any such reasons, but the same shall be a personal privilege to be claimed by any person selected for jury duty. Any citizen over sixty-five (65) years of age may claim this personal privilege outside of open court by providing the clerk of court with information that allows the clerk to determine the validity of the claim.
Provided, however, that no person who has served on the regular panel as a juror in the actual trial of one or more litigated cases in one (1) court may claim the exemption in any other court where he may be called to serve.
SECTION 10. Section 13-5-28, Mississippi Code of 1972, is amended as follows:
13-5-28. If a grand, petit or other jury is ordered to be drawn, the clerk thereafter shall cause each person drawn for jury service to be served with a summons, either personally or by mail, addressed to him at his usual residence, business or post office address, requiring him to report for jury service at a specified time and place. The summons shall include instructions to the potential jurors that explain, in layman's terms, the provisions of Section 13-5-23.
SECTION 11. Section 13-5-34, Mississippi Code of 1972, is amended as follows:
13-5-34. (1) A person summoned for jury service who fails to appear or to complete jury service as directed, and who has failed to obtain a postponement in compliance with the provisions for requesting a postponement, or who fails to appear on the date set pursuant to Section 14 of House Bill No. 13, 2004 First Extraordinary Session, shall be ordered by the court to appear forthwith and show cause for his failure to comply with the summons. If he fails to show good cause for noncompliance with the summons he is in civil contempt of court and * * * may be fined not more than Five Hundred Dollars ($500.00) or imprisoned not more than three (3) days, or both. The prospective juror may be excused from paying sanctions for good cause shown or in the interest of justice.
(2) In addition to, or in lieu of, the fine or imprisonment provided in subsection (1) of this section, the court may order that the prospective juror complete a period of community service for a period no less than if the prospective juror would have completed jury service, and provide proof of completion of this community service to the court.
SECTION 12. Section 25-7-61, Mississippi Code of 1972, is amended as follows:
25-7-61. (1) Fees of jurors shall be payable as follows:
(a) Grand jurors and petit jurors in the chancery, county, circuit and special eminent domain courts shall be paid an amount to be set by the board of supervisors, not to be less than Twenty-five Dollars ($25.00) per day and not to be greater than Forty Dollars ($40.00) per day, plus mileage authorized in Section 25-3-41. In the trial of all cases where jurors are in charge of bailiffs and are not permitted to separate, the sheriff with the approval of the trial judge may pay for room and board of jurors on panel for actual time of trial.
No grand juror shall receive any compensation except mileage unless he shall have been sworn as provided by Section 13-5-45; and no petit juror except those jurors called on special venires shall receive any compensation authorized under this subsection except mileage unless he shall have been sworn as provided by Section 13-5-71.
(b) Jurors making inquisitions of idiocy, lunacy or of unsound mind and jurors on coroner's inquest shall be paid Five Dollars ($5.00) per day plus mileage authorized in Section 25-3-41 by the county treasurer on order of the board of supervisors on certificate of the clerk of the chancery court in which such inquisition is held.
(c) Jurors in the justice courts shall be paid an amount of not less than Ten Dollars ($10.00) per day and not more than Fifteen Dollars ($15.00) per day, to be established by the board of supervisors. In all criminal cases in the justice court wherein the prosecution fails, the fees of jurors shall be paid by the county treasurer on order of the board of supervisors on certificate of the county attorney in all counties that have county attorneys, otherwise by the justice court judge.
(2) Any juror may return the fees provided as compensation for service as a juror to the county which paid for such person's service as a juror. The fees returned to the county may be earmarked for a particular purpose to be selected by the juror, including:
(a) The local public library;
(b) Local law enforcement;
(c) The Mississippi Fire Fighters Memorial Burn Center Fund created in Section 7-9-70, Mississippi Code of 1972; or
(d) Any other governmental agency.
(3) The Administrative Office of Courts shall promulgate rules to establish a Lengthy Trial Fund to be used to provide full or partial wage replacement or wage supplementation to jurors who serve as petit jurors in civil cases for more than ten (10) days.
(a) The court rules shall provide for the following:
(i) The selection and appointment of an administrator for the fund.
(ii) Procedures for the administration of the fund, including payments of salaries of the administrator and other necessary personnel.
(iii) Procedures for the accounting, auditing and investment of money in the Lengthy Trial Fund.
(iv) A report by the Administrative Office of Courts on the administration of the Lengthy Trial Fund in its annual report on the judicial branch, setting forth the money collected for and disbursed from the fund.
(b) The administrator shall use any monies deposited in the Lengthy Trial Fund to pay full or partial wage replacement or supplementation to jurors whose employers pay less than full regular wages when the period of jury service lasts more than ten (10) days.
(c) To the extent funds are available in the Lengthy Trial Fund, and in accordance with any rules or regulations promulgated by the Administrative Office of Courts, the court may pay replacement or supplemental wages out of the Lengthy Trial Fund not to exceed Three Hundred Dollars ($300.00) per day per juror beginning on the eleventh day of jury service. In addition, for any jurors who qualify for payment by virtue of having served on a jury for more than ten (10) days, the court, upon finding that such service posed a significant financial hardship to a juror, even in light of payments made with respect to jury service after the tenth day, may award replacement or supplemental wages out of the Lengthy Trial Fund not to exceed One Hundred Dollars ($100.00) per day from the fourth to the tenth day of jury service.
(d) Any juror who is serving or has served on a jury that qualifies for payment from the Lengthy Trial Fund, provided the service commenced on or after January 1, 2007, may submit a request for payment from the Lengthy Trial Fund on a form that the administrator provides. Payment shall be limited to the difference between the jury fee specified in subsection (1) of this section and the actual amount of wages a juror earns, up to the maximum level payable, minus any amount the juror actually receives from the employer during the same time period.
(i) The form shall disclose the juror's regular wages, the amount the employer will pay during the term of jury service starting on the eleventh day and thereafter, the amount of replacement or supplemental wages requested, and any other information the administrator deems necessary for proper payment.
(ii) The juror also shall be required to submit verification from the employer as to the wage information provided to the administrator, for example, the employee's most recent earnings statement or similar document, prior to initiation of payment from the fund.
(iii) If an individual is self-employed or receives compensation other than wages, the individual may provide a sworn affidavit attesting to his or her approximate gross weekly income, together with such other information as the administrator may require, in order to verify weekly income.
(4) Nothing in this section shall be construed to impose an obligation on any county to place monies in the Lengthy Trial Fund or to pay replacement or supplemental wages to any juror from county funds.
SECTION 13. Section 33-1-5, Mississippi Code of 1972, is amended as follows:
33-1-5. Any member of the Mississippi National Guard on active duty shall be exempt from jury duty upon presenting a current written statement from his superior officer that such jury service will be likely to interfere with his military duties.
SECTION 14. (1) Notwithstanding any other provisions of this chapter, individuals scheduled to appear for jury service have the right to postpone the date of their initial appearance for jury service one (1) time only. Postponements shall be granted upon request, provided that:
(a) The juror has not been granted a postponement within the past two (2) years;
(b) The prospective juror appears in person or contacts the clerk of the court by telephone, electronic mail or in writing to request a postponement; and
(c) Prior to the grant of a postponement with the concurrence of the clerk of the court, the prospective juror fixes a date certain to appear for jury service that is not more than six (6) months or two (2) terms of court after the date on which the prospective juror originally was called to serve and on which date the court will be in session, whichever is the longer period.
(2) A subsequent request to postpone jury service may be approved by a judicial officer only in the event of an extreme emergency, such as a death in the family, sudden illness, or a natural disaster or a national emergency in which the prospective juror is personally involved, that could not have been anticipated at the time the initial postponement was granted. Prior to the grant of a second postponement, the prospective juror must fix a date certain on which the individual will appear for jury service within six (6) months or two (2) terms of court after the postponement on a date when the court will be in session.
(3) The Administrative Office of Courts shall promulgate rules for the implementation of this section.
SECTION 15. (1) It shall be unlawful for any employer or any other person to persuade or attempt to persuade any juror to avoid jury service; to intimidate or to threaten any juror in that respect; or to remove or otherwise subject an employee to adverse employment action as a result of jury service if the employee notifies his or her employer that he or she has been summoned to serve as a juror within a reasonable period of time after receipt of a summons.
(2) It shall be unlawful for an employer to require or request an employee to use annual, vacation or sick leave for time spent responding to a summons for jury duty, time spent participating in the jury selection process, or time spent actually serving on a jury. Nothing in this provision shall be construed to require an employer to provide annual, vacation or sick leave to employees under the provisions of this statute who otherwise are not entitled to such benefits under company policies.
(3) Any violation of subsection (1) or (2) of this section shall be deemed an interference with the administration of justice and a contempt of court and punishable as such.
(4) A court shall automatically postpone and reschedule the service of a summoned juror employed by an employer with five (5) or fewer full-time employees, or their equivalent, if another employee of that employer has previously been summoned to appear during the same period. Such postponement will not constitute the excused individual's right to one (1) automatic postponement under Section 13-5-24.
SECTION 16. Section 73-25-27, Mississippi Code of 1972, is amended as follows:
73-25-27. The Mississippi State Board of Medical Licensure after notice and opportunity for a hearing to the licentiate, is authorized to suspend or revoke for any cause named herein any license it has issued, or the renewal thereof, that authorizes any person to practice medicine, osteopathy, or any other method of preventing, diagnosing, relieving, caring for, or treating, or curing disease, injury or other bodily condition. The procedure for suspension of a license for being out of compliance with an order for support, and the procedure for the reissuance or reinstatement of a license suspended for that purpose, and the payment of any fees for the reissuance or reinstatement of a license suspended for that purpose, shall be governed by Section 93-11-157 or 93-11-163, as the case may be. If there is any conflict between any provision of Section 93-11-157 or 93-11-163 and any provision of this chapter, the provisions of Section 93-11-157 or 93-11-163, as the case may be, shall control.
Such notice shall be effected by registered mail or personal service setting forth the particular reasons for the proposed action and fixing a date not less than thirty (30) days or more than sixty (60) days from the date of such mailing or such service, at which time the licentiate shall be given an opportunity for a prompt and fair hearing. For the purpose of such hearing the board, acting by and through its executive office, may subpoena persons and papers on its own behalf and on behalf of licentiate, including records obtained pursuant to Section 73-25-28, may administer oaths and such testimony when properly transcribed, together with such papers and exhibits, shall be admissible in evidence for or against the licentiate. At such hearing licentiate may appear by counsel and personally in his own behalf. Any person sworn and examined as a witness in such hearing shall not be held to answer criminally, nor shall any papers or documents produced by such witness be competent evidence in any criminal proceedings against such witness other than for perjury in delivering his evidence. Any patient or the representative of the patient who has both filed a complaint with the Board of Medical Licensure against a licentiate and suffered harm to his person that is alleged in the complaint shall have the right, subject to reasonable restrictions imposed by the Board of Medical Licensure, to attend any proceedings that determine substantive rights of a licentiate conducted by the Board of Medical Licensure for disciplinary purposes regarding the licentiate as to that patient's treatment. Notice shall be provided to the patient or his representative at the same time and in the same manner as the notice is made to the licentiate. Whether a patient has suffered harm shall be decided by the Board of Medical Licensure. On the basis of any such hearing, or upon default of the licentiate, the Board of Medical Licensure shall make a determination specifying its findings of fact and conclusions of law.
A copy of such determination shall be sent by registered mail or served personally upon the licentiate. The decision of the Board of Medical Licensure revoking or suspending the license shall become final thirty (30) days after so mailed or served unless within said period the licentiate appeals the decision to the chancery court, pursuant to the provisions hereof, and the proceedings in chancery shall be conducted as other matters coming before the court. All proceedings and evidence, together with exhibits, presented at such hearing before the Board of Medical Licensure in the event of appeal shall be admissible in evidence in said court.
The Board of Medical Licensure may subpoena persons and papers on its own behalf and on behalf of the respondent, including records obtained pursuant to Section 73-25-28, may administer oaths, and may compel the testimony of witnesses. It may issue commissions to take testimony, and testimony so taken and sworn to shall be admissible in evidence for and against the respondent. The Board of Medical Licensure shall be entitled to the assistance of the chancery court or the chancellor in vacation, which, on petition by the board, shall issue ancillary subpoenas and petitions and may punish as for contempt of court in the event of noncompliance therewith.
Unless the court otherwise decrees, a license that has been suspended by the Board of Medical Licensure for a stated period of time shall automatically become valid on the expiration of that period and a license that has been suspended for an indefinite period shall become again valid if and when the Board of Medical Licensure so orders, which it may do on its own motion or on the petition of the respondent. A license that has been revoked shall not be restored to validity except: (1) after a rehearing by the Board of Medical Licensure, on petition of the respondent, for good cause shown, filed within ten (10) days, immediately following the service on him of the order or judgment of the Board of Medical Licensure revoking his license or (2) by order of the court, on petition as aforesaid. Any licentiate whose license becomes again valid after a period of suspension or after it has been restored to validity after a rehearing or by an order of the court, shall record it again in the office of the clerk of the circuit court of the county in which he resides in conformity with the requirements of Section 73-25-13. Nothing in this chapter shall be construed as limiting or revoking the authority of any court or of any licensing or registering officer or board, other than the State Board of Medical Licensure, to suspend, revoke and reinstate licenses and to cancel registrations under the provisions of Section 41-29-311.
SECTION 17. In any medical malpractice action with multiple defendants, the medical privilege shall be considered waived by and between all defendants.
SECTION 18. If the parties to a cause of action agree, any claim filed alleging damages may receive a bench trial which shall be conducted in two hundred seventy (270) days or less after the cause of action has been filed. The cause of action shall be a priority item in the court.
SECTION 19. If any provision of this act is held by a court to be invalid, such invalidity shall not affect the remaining provisions of this act, and to this end the provisions of this act are declared severable.
SECTION 20. Sections 8 through 15 of this act shall take effect and be in force from and after January 1, 2007; the remainder of this act shall take effect and be in force from and after September 1, 2004, and Sections 1 through 7 of this act shall apply to all causes of action filed on or after September 1, 2004.